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INTRODUCTION
Professor Ramirez asked me to share my thoughts, 1 on a wide range of
topics: (1) being the former chief risk officer of Northern Trust, (2) the
2008 financial crisis, (3) risk management in general and Dodd-Frank.
Managing risk is exceptionally difficult, and regulating it is even
harder. In the wise words of Yogi Berra: “In theory, there is no difference
between practice and theory, but in practice, there is.”2
Expert judgement, behavioral research, and statistical analysis are all
needed to be successful in managing risk and creating regulation. There
is always strong debate around the role of risk management and
regulation. Does theory work? Are financial institutions too complex?
Are financial markets as well as financial instruments too complex? Who
can predict the future? Will we be safe given our controls?
At the highest level of abstraction, regulation exists to both prevent the
next financial crisis and systemic failures, as well as protect against an
* Former Chief Risk Officer at Northern Trust.
1. This piece reflects the points I covered in my speech at Loyola University Chicago’s Annual
Institute for Investor Protection Symposium. Program, Loyola’s Annual Institute for Investor
Protection, Roundtable Conference, Lehman 10 Years Later: Lessons Learned?, available at
http://www.ilep.info/pdf/symposia/2018_LUC_IIP_Program.pdf.
2. This quote has been attributed to multiple people, including Yogi Berra, Albert Einstein, Jan
L. A. van de Snepscheut, and others. In Theory There Is No Difference Between Theory and
Practice, While in Practice There Is, QUOTE INVESTIGATOR (Apr. 14, 2018),
https://quoteinvestigator.com/2018/04/14/theory/. Some say the quote is “so true, it doesn’t matter
who said it.” SIGNAL V. NOISE (Dec. 1, 2012), https://signalvnoise.com/posts/3346-in-theory-thereis-no-difference-between.
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idiosyncratic bank failure in the future. At the same time, risk
management’s three goals are to balance risk and return, avoid an
idiosyncratic failure, and to survive a systemic failure. Remember,
a
bank takes risks in order to serve their clients and generate returns for
their shareholders. It could be credit risk, operational risk, strategic risk,
market risk or liquidity risk.
In layperson’s terms, fire prevention in the western states is a great
example of a risk-avoiding regulation. The fire code requires specific
building elements such as smoke detectors and fire extinguishers, as well
as limits on campfires during dry seasons—looking to prevent both an
idiosyncratic building fire as well as a systemic, widespread forest fire.
Meanwhile, high-value homeowners, with strong incentives from the
insurance companies, build in fire management solutions, such as ponds,
in front of their houses, with the goal being to survive both a forest fire
as well as to survive a fire starting in one’s own kitchen.
I. EIGHT ELEMENTS FOR EFFECTIVE RISK MANAGEMENT
As the CRO of Northern Trust from 2011–2017, my goal was to evolve
our risk management framework and to protect the bank from a systemic
or idiosyncratic failure. But my ultimate goal was to act in a way that
would enable me to sleep at night. There were eight elements to the
framework I used, which allowed me to achieve all three of those goals.
1. Know your risk takers—In 2011, I had been at Northern Trust for
eighteen years as a risk taker. So, I knew all the material risk takers in the
company, having worked with them in some capacity in previous roles.
A bank inherently takes risks to serve its clients and generate returns for
its shareholders, but those risks must be made mindfully.
2. Build a Superior Risk Team—Create an excellent and growing
team of risk management professionals, comprised of people from the
business (former risk takers) and risk management professionals.
3. Risk Framework—Develop a strong set of policies and procedures
that define the enterprise risk management framework. This framework
should in part be driven by Dodd-Frank.
4. Four-Dimensional Governance—Use a governance framework that
looks at the company’s risks across four major categories: geography,
risk type, legal entity, and business unit. This framework should factor in
Dodd-Frank and foreign regulations.
5. Improve Capital and Liquidity Levels—Dodd-Frank and other
regulations took these buffers to a whole new level. There is a benefit
tradeoff between society and shareholders with this dynamic.
6. Direct Access to the Board of Directors—To be effective, the chief
risk officer requires unrestricted access to the board. Topics can range
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from individuals, to businesses, to risk management resources.
7. Cultural Risk Appetite—Financial institutions exist along a
spectrum of risk appetite—from those where risk taking is encouraged
through an incentive compensation structure, to those where customer
retention is more highly valued. As any chief risk officer knows,
swimming against a strong “cultural” current is difficult. There are two
broad categories of risk: there are risks you take, such as credit or
operational risks, and there are other risks that happen to you, like cyber
risk. Unfortunately, some banks take compliance risk, which can lead to
dire repercussions for both the bank and various aspects of the economy.
8. Positive Relationship with the Fed—As chief risk officer of
Northern Trust, I experienced a very constructive and yet often frustrating
relationship with the Fed. I often compared the Fed regulators, enforcing
Dodd-Frank, to a personal trainer. You may not like doing the crunches
and pushups that the trainer demands, but in the end, it is beneficial for
you.
II. HOW TO BE A RISK MANAGER, AND ALSO SLEEP AT NIGHT
In my quest to sleep at night, I made sure that, during my waking hours,
I was focused on the following complexities inherent in
banking—including:
1. Human Misbehavior—Examples include The London Whale,
money laundering, foreign exchange manipulation, LIBOR
manipulation, and compliance violations ranging from auto to mortgage
lending.
2. Boom/Bust Cycles—As the old banker adage goes, the worst of
loans are made in the best of times.
3. Risk/Return Trade Offs—Can you quantify the risk? And what’s the
probability of return?
4. Lobbying—As you have read in the newspapers, it’s currently
impacting the Dodd-Frank regulations.
5. Financial Innovation—Are derivatives weapons of mass
destruction?
Much has been researched and written about the crisis and the
dynamics at play. But to me, one perspective from the sport of mountain
climbing rings true. “Jill Fredston is a nationally recognized avalanche
expert . . . She knows about a kind of moral hazard risk, where better
safety gear can entice climbers to take more risk—making them in fact
less safe.”3
3. Jeff Pantages, High-Stakes Dare of Investors to Risk Avalanche, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS
(Aug. 20, 2007), https://www.pionline.com/article/20070820/PRINT/70816021/high-stakes-dareof-investors-to-risk-avalanche.
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III. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
Ten years ago, ten factors created a perfect storm that led to
outsized financial risk, and ultimately the financial crisis.4
1. Credit bubble
2. Housing bubble
3. Nontraditional mortgages/securitization
4. Credit rating agencies
5. Financial institution concentrated correlated risk
6. Leverage and liquidity
7. Risk contagion
8. Common housing shock
9. Financial shock and panic
10. Financial crisis leading to economic crises
According to the US Government Financial Crisis inquiry report of
2011:5 financial crisis was avoidable; widespread failure in financial
regulation and supervision proved devastating to the stability of the
nation’s financial markets; and dramatic failure of corporate governance
and risk management occurred at many systemically important financial
institutions. Excessive borrowing, risky investments, and lack of
transparency put the financial system on a collision course with the crisis.
Additionally, the government was ill-prepared for the crisis, and its
inconsistent response added uncertainty and panic. But overall, there was
a systemic breakdown in accountability and ethics that led to the crisis.
As is well known, the Dodd-Frank Act followed the crisis and
addressed many topics including:
1. Capital
2. Liquidity
3. Leverage
4. Annual stress testing
5. Derivative reform
6. Credit rating agencies
7. Consumer financial protection
8. Volcker rule
9. Executive pay disclosure
10. Resolution authority
11. Living wills
12. Deposit concentration limits
4. These factors are identified in FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
INQUIRY REPORT 417–19 (2011), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPOFCIC.pdf.
5. See generally id.
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13. Elimination of FDIC guarantee authority
14. Elimination of Fed power to lend to nonbanks
As we think about Dodd-Frank, we should ask ourselves whether
increased regulation that drives intense regulatory supervision can reduce
the risks in banks, many of which are systematically important financial
institutions. Dodd-Frank empowered regulators with rules and data to
proactively assess a bank’s decisions on strategy, operating model, risk
appetite, governance, and risk culture.
However, culture is a difficult animal to regulate. It is what results in
either prudent or excessive risk taking. It is what permits or discourages
risk taking, beyond corporate appetite or for personal enrichment. A
strong risk culture results in recognizing risk issues, assessing risk,
escalating issues, and timely remediation. It drives accountability, tone
from the top, open challenge, compensation paradigms, teamwork, and
succession.
IV. HOW EFFECTIVE IS DODD-FRANK?
As we are in an academic setting, this section will give a test to DoddFrank and grade it on an A–F scale:
Did Dodd-Frank strengthen the regulator and supervisory framework
to create safeguards to prevent future unknown crises and avoid taxpayer
funded bailouts of some banks?
[Grade A]
Did Dodd-Frank strengthen risk management and governance around
capital, liquidity, and risk appetite?
[Grade A]
Did Dodd-Frank effectively address shadow banking, repossessions,
derivatives, off-balance-sheet entities, credit agencies, securitization, and
mortgage lending?
[on average, Grade B]
Did Dodd-Frank materially improve the regulators’ understanding of
the financial system, its interconnectivity, and exposure management?
[Grade A]
Did Dodd-Frank change tone from the top and bank executive
accountability?
[Time will tell]
Alhough Dodd-Frank has a strong report card from me, it is important for
us to remember the famed investor, Howard Marks’s statement:
Risk exists only in the future, and it’s impossible to know for sure
what the future holds. . . . No ambiguity is evident when we view the
past. . . . Many things could have happened in each case in the past, and
the fact that only one did happen, understates the variability that existed.
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....
Projections tend to cluster around historic norms and call for only
small changes. . . . The point is, people usually expect the future to be
like the past and under estimate the potential for change.
....
People overestimate their ability to gauge risk and understand
mechanisms they’ve never before seen in operation6

CONCLUSION
I would now like to share some thoughts from a former chief risk
officer:
At times, a one size fits all mentality across regulatory enforcement
occurs, which is suboptimal for a bank and its shareholders. A balance
must be struck between statistical models and expert judgement. Bank
boards have potential to lose the forest for the trees due to regulatory
compliance oversight. And the next generation of bankers and regulators
will benefit from further enhancement of data. But what are the soft and
hard costs to society and to bank shareholders due to Dodd-Frank? They
are at times on the opposite side of the trade. The pendulum is currently
swinging back. Where should it land?
In summary, for regulation to be effective, it must be paired with a
strong risk management framework, consisting of:
1. Known risk takers
2. Strong risk team
3. Risk framework policies
4. Four-dimensional governance
5. Strong capital and liquidity
6. Access to board of directors
7. Prudent cultural risk appetite
8. Partnership with regulators
Hopefully this framework will be a beneficial approach to protect
against the next financial crisis, whether it be due to US pension
shortfalls, municipal debt levels, the Eurozone, or a cyber-attack that
precipitates a crisis.

6. HOWARD MARKS, THE MOST IMPORTANT
THE THOUGHTFUL INVESTOR 55, 56 (2013).
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